Ferrari Mailing List: Fwd: Tom Rubython: Michael Schumacher - The strange story of his retirement

[red5hilser (red5hilser]

This kind of stuff is what makes F1 so damned interesting. BTW, did you hear 
that McLaren is the biggest spender in F1 today with a budget of $500M? Move 
over, Ferrari.
 
Yer pal Ferrari Bubba


www.f1i.com
 
The dramatic circumstances of the Italian Grand Prix and Michael Schumacherâs 
retirement will live on for a long time. After his rival was sidelined by a 
bizarre stewardsâ decision, Schumacher won the race and then announced his 
retirement. But it was an amazing few hours, worthy of a scripted piece of 
drama. BusinessF1 retraced the moves that led to that startling finish. 

On Sunday 10th September 2006 at 3:25pm, precisely the same time as Michael 
Schumacher passed the checkered flag to win the Italian Grand Prix, the staff 
of Ferrariâs press supremo, Luca Colajanni, started handing an A4 sheet of 
paper to journalists outside the teamâs motorhome. It was a one-page press 
release announcing the retirement of the most successful racing driver in 
history, a driver at the top of his game challenging for the world 
championship. Colajanni had been given precise orders by Ferrari chairman Luca 
di Montezemolo about just what he had to do and when he had to do it. 

It was strange timing, as Schumacher was about to make the announcement himself 
in the winnerâs press conference after the podium ceremony. Normally press 
releases are handed out after an announcement has been made, or during it â 
but rarely before. It takes away the point. As so it turned out when half an 
hour later Schumacher found himself announcing what everybody already knew. 

The Ferrari teamâs haste to announce its driverâs retirement was indeed 
bizarre. Colajanni had wanted to pre-empt the driverâs own announcement as if 
to make sure there was no turning back. 

Montezemolo had exercised a strong presence in the Ferrari garage at Monza Park 
all weekend. On qualifying day he hovered around the Ferrari motorhome waving 
away journalistsâ enquiries about what was going on. On race-day he had 
arrived with John Elkann, the most senior member of the Agnelli family working 
at Fiat, and Sergio Marchionne, the chief executive of Fiat. He also had Piero 
Ferrari in his party. One observer was mystified at the presence of all these 
big guns and said: âIt was as though Luca wanted reinforcements.â But 
reinforcements for what? It was soon to become clear. Although everything 
looked normal in the Ferrari garage and motorhome, underneath the surface a 
civil war was concluding, in Montezemoloâs favour. It had run all summer, but 
was finally coming to an end. All that Montezemolo now required was for Jean 
Todt, the team principal, and Michael Schumacher, the number one driver, to run 
up the white flag. 

In truth no one knew what was about to happen. Schumacher didnât want to 
retire, at least not that day. And he thought he still retained enough power to 
get his way. But Montezemolo had long before given him a deadline of Monza and 
told him (expressly against Jean Todtâs wishes) that it was either driving 
alongside Kimi RÃikkÃnen in 2007 â or retirement.

In a previous age no one had dared tell Michael Schumacher what to do. He had 
been king of Formula One for 12 years and for half of them was easily the 
sportâs most powerful man, eclipsing even Bernie Ecclestone. 

Montezemolo hated this situation and had also come to resent Jean Todtâs role 
in the Michael Schumacher show. He took the Enzo Ferrari view that drivers were 
employees who performed at the behest of their employers. Todt on the other 
hand took a collegiate view; the top people at the team, including Schumacher, 
were his close friends and far from being his employees. 

But there is no doubt that this combination of opposing management styles got 
the job done. And for that reason each had tolerated the other. 

Only once before in the 11 seasons that Schumacher had been a Ferrari driver, 
in 1999, had Montezemolo insisted on getting his way.

Officially, of course, none of the above occurred. The official line was that 
Schumacher had simply decided to retire many months before and that Ferrari had 
signed RÃikkÃnen to take his place, end of story. In fact, Todt suggested 
anyone who thought any different was âstupidâ. 

Everyone, then, is stupid. 

There was clearly tension between Todt and Montezemolo that weekend in Monza. 
On Friday and Saturday, there had been an uneasy peace as both men went about 
their business. Then, on race-day, with less than 15 minutes to the start, 
Montezemolo broke away from Ferrari on the grid and went up to RÃikkÃnenâs 
car. He leaned over the cockpit and gave a thumbs-up sign, as if indicating 
that all was going to plan. It was a strange action to pursue with his teamâs 
close competitor at Ferrariâs home race. 

After Schumacherâs race victory, Montezemolo was delirious with joy and, 
flanked by Elkann and Marchionne, in the full glare of television, he embraced 
Jean Todt and kissed him. But as Montezemolo kissed him Italian style and threw 
his arms around his shoulders, Todt quickly turned away. It resembled the scene 
in âThe Godfather Part IIIâ when Michael Corleone embraces his brother 
Fredo whilst whispering his death sentence. 

Then it was Michael Schumacherâs turn. After being pecked by Montezemolo, he 
too resisted his bossâs celebratory embraces and looked blankly over his 
shoulder. For Montezemolo, as he embraced the two men he knew the press release 
signalling his victory was being handed out to journalists. 

It was now clear to insiders that Montezemolo had won his internal battle with 
Todt to turn RÃikkÃnenâs option into a firm contract drive for Ferrari in 
2007. And it was clear that Schumacherâs ultimatum of âRÃikkÃnenâs or 
meâ had been ignored. 

It was a battle Montezemolo had been determined to win. Six years earlier, to 
give the team the very best chance of winning, he had wanted to hire Mika 
HÃkkinen as team-mate to Schumacher. But he had been blocked by the twin 
powers of Schumacher and Todt. This time he was determined to prevail. He 
wanted RÃikkÃnen, and if that meant Schumacherâs departure, then so be it. 
And he also made it clear he was not prepared to carry on paying Schumacher his 
US$45 million a year in his twilight years. In any case that money was no 
longer available, it had been allocated to RÃikkÃnen in a deal skilfully 
negotiated by the driverâs manager David Robertson. 

In truth Schumacher was not simply being pushed out of Ferrari, he was not 
prepared to carry on under the terms that were being offered. So he reluctantly 
decided to retire. And in any event it was good timing â he was going out at 
the peak of his powers. 

Naturally, in the circumstances, the two press conferences, first for TV and 
then for the press were sad affairs. Schumacher was very morose. He clearly saw 
no happiness in retirement. But he played the company line and did not vent any 
feelings of being pushed out. That was not Schumacherâs way. And the timing 
of the press release before his own announcement had given him no room for 
manoeuvre. It was done on the express orders of Montezemolo to ensure that he, 
and not Schumacher, was setting the agenda. 

The sense of despair from Schumacher was obvious. He is the one driver on the 
grid who genuinely loves Formula One. He lives and breathes it. Whilst some 
other multiple world champions have rushed into retirement, he seemed set to 
drive on into his 40s. He was clearly not ready to retire after 16 seasons of 
racing, nearly double the average career span and equalling the career of 
Ricardo Patrese. 

But at the age of 37, he found, like many others, that as far as Montezemolo 
was concerned he was past his sell-by date. As Schumacherâs long-time 
manager, Willi Weber, woefully observed in a passing comment to a journalist at 
Monza: âMichael found he no longer has the power he thought at Ferrari.â So 
Schumacherâs retirement was just as controversial as his entry into the sport 
at the Belgian Grand Prix in first practice on Friday 23rd August 1991. 

The countdown for Schumacherâs demise had begun on 25th August 2005 when 
RÃikkÃnen signed a one-year option which gave Ferrari the right, within a 
certain time period, to employ him, at a salary of around US$45 million, for 
three years from 2007 to 2009 with options to renew beyond that. The option 
price had never been confirmed but was rumoured around the paddock to be US$5 
million. 

Everybody knew that the driversâ market was headed for a shake-up in 2007. It 
became clear that the contracts of the three best drivers in the world, 
Schumacher, RÃikkÃnen and Fernando Alonso were all expiring at the same time 
â at end of 2006. It was a unique event in Formula One history and meant that 
all three could be driving at different teams in 2007. In normal circumstances 
one or two of the top drivers might be out of contract at the same time, but 
never three. However, in truth nobody expected any of the three to move from 
their incumbent teams. Schumacher was an absolute fixture at Ferrari and 
showing no sign of retiring. Alonso was winning everything at Renault so why 
would he move, especially as Flavio Briatore, the Renault team principal, was 
his manager? And RÃikkÃnen, despite coming to the end of his contract, had 
options for the future and really nowhere else to go. 

And that was how it looked in the summer of 2005 as RÃikkÃnenâs manager, 
David Robertson, and McLaren Mercedes team principal, Ron Dennis, sat down to 
discuss the Finnish driverâs future. It was to be the first of the big driver 
negotiations for 2007.

As far as Robertson was concerned, it was all going to be pretty 
straightforward. He couldnât comprehend RÃikkÃnen leaving. The contract was 
up but Dennis had options to renew it well into the future. These options all 
stemmed from the original contract RÃikkÃnen had signed in September 2001. 
Dennis had paid a small fortune to secure RÃikkÃnenâs services including a 
rumoured US$14 million to compensate Peter Sauber. It was a complex contract 
â two years (2002 and 2003) at a modest salary and then three years 
(2004-2006) for a much larger retainer culminating in the near US$45 million he 
was being paid in 2006. But RÃikkÃnen was far from a free agent at the end of 
his McLaren contract. By all accounts it was at Dennisâs option to take up 
another three years if he was willing to pay an escalating salary. 

Dennis had security, but at a price. There is no way of telling what that price 
was but it was likely to mean RÃikkÃnen receiving at least US$60-US$70 
million a year by 2009. But Dennis, who had been bamboozled into agreeing the 
high price four years before in 2001, just before the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
when economic conditions had been very different, did not want to pay, although 
he still wanted RÃikkÃnen to drive for him. 
By all accounts Robertson was somewhat surprised, even if he didnât show it, 
when Dennis said he wasnât taking up the option. Although there is no 
independent confirmation of this it appears that Dennis believed he could 
cancel the option, and thereby his commitment, and open negotiations with 
Robertson at a more sensible retainer. After all Dennis believed, and it 
certainly looked the case, that RÃikkÃnen had nowhere else to go. 

It appears Dennis genuinely believed Robertson would simply agree a lower 
retainer, probably something nearer US$35 million. But it proved Dennis did not 
know the man at all. Robertson is an extremely shrewd individual. Even his 
critics say he can read the minds of team principals. He is believed to study 
their psyche in his spare time so that he can deal with them more effectively. 
In his short career in the paddock he has already negotiated with Frank 
Williams, Flavio Briatore, Ron Dennis and Jean Todt, and bested all of them. 

Anyone who has had negotiations with him of any kind is aware of his skills. As 
one associate says: âHe is the sort of man, and this is not said impolitely, 
with whom one counts ones fingers after shaking his hand. He probably secretly 
relishes that reputation.â

It is important to emphasise that at that stage of the 2005 season, in spite of 
Robertsonâs reputation, Dennis thought he held all the cards. RÃikkÃnen was 
dominating the latter half of the 2005 season and McLaren was the top team. 
Conversely Ferrari was in the doldrums â why would RÃikkÃnen want to go 
there even if he could? 

And Renault was out of the equation. Everyone thought Alonso was a fixture at 
Renault. When Dennis let RÃikkÃnenâs option lapse he knew, or at least 
thought he knew, that he could simply wait for Robertson to accept his offer. 

But Robertson sensed something different. He sensed discontent in the McLaren 
organisation, a sense of drift. He had picked up that Adrian Newey was leaving 
and that Nick Tombazis might do the same. He also thought most of Ferrariâs 
problems were tyre related and solvable; he knew that Ross Brawn and Rory Byrne 
had not suddenly become bad engineers. 

But Robertson kept his counsel with Dennis and said he would get back to him. 

Robertson considered his options and marched over to the Ferrari motorhome to 
get the lie of the land. He imagined negotiations with Todt alone would be a 
waste of time. So he sought to engage Montezemolo and Todt together. Again the 
wily operator had picked up their differences on his radar and thought he might 
be able to divide and conquer. He was absolutely correct. Whilst Todt was cool 
to the idea of hiring RÃikkÃnen, Montezemolo was more than keen. But there 
were complications. Ferrari already had an option with Valentino Rossi and Todt 
doubted openly that Schumacher would want RÃikkÃnen alongside him. But 
Robertson spoke privately to Montezemolo. Soon the two men agreed to sign 
RÃikkÃnen to an option in Ferrariâs favour for a year, and to pay for the 
privilege. 

But Robertson was not out of the woods. At that point he did not think Ferrari 
would actually sign RÃikkÃnen. But it was his leverage on Ron Dennis. 
Robertson made sure by judicious leaks to journalist friends that it got around 
the paddock about Ferrariâs option. Dennisâs bluff had been publicly 
called. 

And so matters rested, until the end of the season when Dennis heard on the 
grapevine that RÃikkÃnen had signed for Ferrari. Although it was only an 
option he guessed immediately what was going on and decided he was not about to 
be kept on a string for a year whilst Ferrari decided his future. 

By then the situation with the third driver in the loop, Fernando Alonso, was 
becoming clouded as rumours spread that Renault would withdraw from Formula One 
at the end of 2006. One very highly placed pundit whispered in Dennisâs ear 
that he had heard this would definitely happen. As sad as that might be for 
Formula One, Dennis realised it was very good news for him. As the rumour 
gained currency, whatever its truth, it effectively put Alonso into play.  

Dennis made an approach for Alonso. He understood, as did everyone else in the 
paddock, that at around US$6 million a year, Alonso was underpaid. Dennis 
offered Alonso US$16 million a year. The timing of the move was perfect. 

At that point Renaultâs prospects for 2007 were at their lowest and 
McLarenâs, after its storming season, at their highest. McLaren had also just 
announced it had signed Vodafone as title sponsor for 2007; it had more cash 
than ever. With all things considered Alonsoâs manager Flavio Briatore had no 
choice but to advise his driver to accept Dennisâs offer. He knew Renault at 
that moment in time would not match it (although later the situation was to 
change). 

Dennis attached one condition to his offer â he wanted to announce it 
immediately despite the disruption it would cause to his existing drivers. 
Close friends say he was driven by a desire to get back at David Robertson and 
tell the Formula One world how clever he was.  

Alonsoâs signing was announced to an unsuspecting world just before Christmas 
2005. It caused a sensation, mainly revolving around Briatoreâs position and 
the obvious conflict of interest. Briatore took it all in his stride. 
Interestingly he and Dennis came up with entirely different stories of how 
Alonso was signed. But by then it didnât matter. After the ravages inflicted 
on his bank account by David Robertson, Dennis considered it a good dayâs 
work to get Alonso for just US$16 million. 

But Dennis had seriously piqued his existing drivers and when they heard the 
news both vowed to leave the team at the end of 2006. They felt they had been 
double-crossed. RÃikkÃnenâs position for 2007 suddenly looked precarious. 

Over at Ferrari, Michael Schumacher was as entrenched as ever and the Italian 
team had signed an option with Valentino Rossi for 2007, this one at the 
driverâs behest. If Rossi decided to take up his option there would be no 
room for RÃikkÃnen. The situation was slightly complicated when Rubens 
Barrichello read the tea leaves and saw that he also would be out at the end of 
2006. Honda was desperate to sign him and he negotiated a release from his 
contract to take a big money, three-year deal. To replace him the team signed 
Felipe Massa on a one-year contract as a stop-gap. Schumacher expected that it 
would be him and Rossi in the cockpit for 2007. 

But as 2006 began, Montezemolo realised he didnât want that. Signing Rossi 
was Todt and Schumacherâs plan. He wanted RÃikkÃnen, his man, in the car 
for 2007, and started scheming to get his way.

It may seem ridiculous that Montezemolo had effectively to politic within his 
own company, but that is the way it was. Todt had made Ferrari his own fiefdom, 
much to the annoyance of Montezemolo. The two had already clashed earlier this 
year when Montezemolo wanted to take Marlboro off the car for 2007 and find a 
non-tobacco sponsor. Todt wanted to stay with an eager Marlboro. Montezemolo 
tried everything he could to find an alternative and even invited Sir Martin 
Sorrell, chief executive of WPP Group, the worldâs biggest advertising agency 
group, to visit him in Maranello. Ostensibly he wanted to discuss whether WPP 
and its network of sponsorship agencies could help with finding a new title 
sponsor for 2007. 

But Todt found out about Sorrellâs visit. And when Sorrell arrived at 
Maranello, he did not meet with Montezemolo but with the Frenchman. Predictably 
the discussions went nowhere. Todt told Sorrell he already had a title sponsor 
for 2007 and asked him why he was there. Sorrell wondered that himself and the 
visit had effectively been a waste of his time. But as Sorrell was leaving, 
walking down the corridor on his way to Ferrariâs reception, Montezemolo 
jumped out of a door in front of him and ushered him into a small adjacent 
conference room. He asked him what had been discussed with Todt and when 
Sorrell told him, begged him to find an alternative to Marlboro. It was all 
over in 10 minutes and Sorrell left Maranello shaking his head at the 
shenanigans he had witnessed between the two men. Sorrell had no intention of 
wasting his time trying to find a title sponsor for a team that already had 
one. Todt had already told Sorrell he had done a deal with his friend Louis 
Camilleri, the chairman of Altria, the Marlboro parent company. Camilleri had 
agreed a five-year deal from 2007 to pay US$200 million a year. It was the 
biggest sponsorship deal ever in Formula One and an offer the team could not 
turn down. 

Montezemolo was in despair after the Marlboro deal was signed. It made Todt, 
now seen as a top rainmaker, even more powerful inside the team. In fact 
Montezemolo had begun to feel like a stranger in his own factory. Continually 
away on Fiat and Italian business, Montezemolo realised he had made a mistake 
when he had promoted Todt the year before to head the whole Ferrari car 
factory. He had expected him to fall flat on his face but instead he rose to 
the task and Ferrari, which had been in the financial doldrums, began a 
remarkable recovery under Todtâs stewardship. 

Montezemolo felt he had created a monster in Todt that he could no longer 
control. Although the two men had worked together for more than a decade, they 
were like chalk and cheese. Behind the rough exterior, Todt is a self-made, 
cultured man, an art lover with impeccable taste. In 2005 he had teamed up with 
Hollywood actress, Michelle Yeoh, got engaged to her and was in many ways 
beginning to outshine Montezemolo himself. 

By contrast Montezemolo is a proud aristocrat. A member of the Agnelli family 
by any other name, he is regarded within the Fiat empire as a marketing 
wunderkind. 

No one in Maranello can understand why the Todt-Montezemolo alliance has lasted 
so long. One observer said: âIt is a mystery, Todtâs not Lucaâs sort of 
person and vice versa.â

It was never part of Montezemoloâs plan to get rid of Todt, he simply wanted 
to break up the Todt-Brawn-Schumacher alliance that so effectively controlled 
the team. And it appears that the battleground was drawn over Michael 
Schumacher, with both men determined to get their way. 

But Montezemolo was more determined. 

Montezemolo was not overawed by Michael Schumacher as so clearly was Jean Todt. 
That was shown in 1999 when the two men faced up to each other after Schumacher 
broke his leg at the British Grand Prix. Even after he had recovered enough to 
go testing Schumacher announced on Sunday 3rd October that he would not be fit 
enough to take part in the remaining two races of the year in Malaysia and 
Japan. 

After the accident Eddie Irvine had taken up the running for the world 
championship title and badly needed the help of a strong team-mate. But the 
last thing Schumacher appeared to want was his team-mate to win the world 
championship and he had clearly decided, with Todtâs collaboration, to see 
the last two races out. Irvine pleaded with Montezemolo to intervene. 

What happened next was instructive in the differing relationships Schumacher 
enjoyed with Todt and Montezemolo. On the afternoon of Tuesday 5th October 
1999, Montezemolo rang Schumacher at his home in Switzerland to ask if he would 
change his mind and drive. But Schumacherâs young daughter Gina-Maria 
answered the phone and told Montezemolo that her Daddy was âgetting out of 
his football bootsâ. Montezemolo questioned the little girl more closely and 
ascertained that she and her brother had been enjoying a rough game of football 
in the garden with their father. When Schumacher finally came to the phone, 
Montezemolo asked him if indeed he had been playing football. The German had no 
choice but to be truthful. Once Montezemolo heard that, he said to him that if 
he was fit enough to play football he was fit enough to drive in Malaysia and 
Japan. When Schumacher resisted, Montezemolo reminded him that he was being 
paid US$2 million a race and would do as he was told. Schumacher had no choice 
but to comply and on Friday 8th October the team announced he would indeed be 
returning for the last two races.  

The incident had been a lesson for Montezemolo, who realised that a secret 
conspiracy existed between Todt and Schumacher. 

He had run up against it before when he had wanted to hire Mika HÃkkinen to 
partner Schumacher. Then Todt had told Montezemolo that Schumacher would not 
have it and would leave. In effect Schumacher was so powerful he could dictate 
terms and Montezemolo could not risk calling his bluff. But Montezemolo 
believed Schumacher would have stayed and was left smarting by his rebuttal at 
the hands of the two men. 

So when the chance came to sign Kimi RÃÃkkÃnen in the summer of 2005, 
Montezemolo was determined to grab it. After a poor season when the team had 
won nothing bar the controversial United States Grand Prix, Montezemolo sensed 
that Schumacherâs reign was coming to an end. He would be nearly 38 when his 
last contract ended in 2006. 

So when David Robertson came calling, Montezemolo was all ears. Robertson 
brilliantly played off Montezemolo and Todt against each other. According to 
sources at Ferrari, Montezemolo didnât want to get into a situation next year 
where he was looking for a top-line driver and everyone was signed up. 
Montezemolo is in instinctive man and, as one person close to Ferrari observes: 
âHe decided to put the bunsen-burner under the situation.â

That person confirms that Montezemolo had been bitterly disappointed when he 
couldnât sign HÃkkinen and it had always rankled: âThe aggravation with 
Todt has been there the whole time but came to a head at Monza. Luca had wanted 
to see HÃkkinen in the other car. He believes it is 200 per cent about the 
drivers.â

During the 2005 season Montezemolo decided he didnât want Valentino Rossi 
even though he had a firm option to join the team. He persuaded Rossi not to 
take it up and stay in MotoGP. This decision upset Schumacher who could see 
what it meant. Rossi had had a programme mapped out to familiarise himself with 
the car prior to a 2007 debut. Schumacher said at the time: âWe are sad not 
to see him here. I think he has a very high talent and could have done it in 
terms of driving.â Ross Brawn, the Ferrari technical director and a strong 
Todt-Schumacher ally was also upset and said: âWe were very impressed with 
what he was able to do. It would have been very exciting. He was very 
impressive in all the running we did, otherwise we wouldnât have taken him so 
seriously. It would have been a nice challenge to have. Itâs a shame.â 

Rossiâs announcement fuelled speculation that Ferrari had already decided 
upon its 2007 driver line-up and that Kimi RÃikkÃnen would be named as 
Michael Schumacherâs team-mate for next season. But by midsummer it was far 
from decided and a full-scale battle was going on inside Ferrari. There was a 
stand-off, which would continue until the deadline to take up RÃikkÃnenâs 
option. 

Meanwhile, David Robertson was sensing that Ferrari might not take up 
RÃikkÃnenâs option and that Schumacher would not drive alongside him. That 
prompted him to renew relations with Ron Dennis and make sure his options were 
still open there. But with McLarenâs 2006 car having flopped and the three 
top technical men, led by Adrian Newey, having left the team, conditions were 
totally different. So in May, Robertson started serious negotiations with 
Flavio Briatore to take RÃikkÃnen to Renault. Robertson found a team 
principal who very badly wanted to do a deal. The downside was that the 
retainer was half what he had been getting at McLaren and half of what he had 
been offered at Ferrari. But against that was a very competitive car; in May it 
was the most competitive car. 

The negotiations were a surprise as Briatore had clashed with Robertson in 2001 
and openly criticised him and his methods. But now the Italian turned on the 
charm offensive and entertained Robertson, and his son Steve, on his boat in 
Monte Carlo. He also introduced them to his ravishing new girlfriend, 
Elisabetta Gregoracci, and she worked her own charms on the two men as they 
toured the Renault team principalâs new yacht in Monaco harbour. 

Briatore was ready to forget the past if there was a deal to be done. And he 
badly needed the deal. By this time his position was very different to how it 
had been in December 2005. Now the future was clear and Carlos Ghosn, the 
Renault chairman, had made a long-term commitment to the team and even turned 
on the cash spigot. Briatore was able to offer RÃikkÃnen a decent retainer, 
said to be US$21 million but with the added opportunity to accept outside 
endorsements, which could have been worth another US$10 million.

The two men held detailed negotiations and Briatore personally spent a lot of 
time wooing Robertson. Later Briatore would angrily tell friends that he felt 
Robertson had been wasting his time and had been committed to Ferrari at the 
same time as he was offering RÃikkÃnen to Renault. However, this was not the 
case. Robertson had been negotiating in the genuine belief that Ferrari would 
not take up its option because of Schumacher. 

All through the early summer, civil war raged behind the scenes at Maranello. 
But Schumacher found his power to get his way had gone. Montezemolo appeared 
not to care whether he stayed or went. At the German Grand Prix, which 
Schumacher won with Massa second and RÃikkÃnen third, the Ferrari number one 
driver put on a very public show of affection for his team-mate and totally 
ignored RÃikkÃnen. It was a classic Schumacher display: he was demonstrating 
publicly to Montezemolo how he wanted it to be and how good it could be. But 
Montezemolo was totally unmoved. In fact insiders say it hardened his resolve 
to dislodge the superstar. And in August, Robertson was proved wrong when 
Montezemolo signed the contract with him. No one close to Ferrari was 
surprised, as one insider says: âLuca, being the politician that he is, 
closed off every rat hole.â

When Schumacher learned the news, he told Montezemolo he wanted until the end 
of the season to make up his mind about whether he would stay and partner 
RÃikkÃnen. In the meantime, he didnât want any announcement made about 
RÃikkÃnen. But Montezemolo was not having any of that. He wanted the 
situation resolved and told Schumacher he wanted his decision by Monza, when he 
would announce RÃikkÃnen. By then it appears Ross Brawn had also decided he 
would leave if Schumacher did. That news was leaked to journalists to pile 
pressure on Montezemolo.  

The writing was on the wall. Montezemolo had come this far and was not about to 
turn back. 

Montezemolo won the battle: Schumacher would not drive with RÃikkÃnen and 
would instead announce his retirement. But the decision was very much against 
his will. 

He would have rather carried on with Felipe Massa as his team-mate. Now the 
seven times world champion, still only 37, has to decide what to do next and 
where life will take him. 

Meanwhile, none of the pronouncements so far can be taken for granted. Despite 
the 17 years since Enzo Ferrariâs death, Ferrari is still a very 
Machiavellian organisation and Jean Todt, predictably, is seething about losing 
this public battle with Montezemolo. He knows he will never have the same type 
of relationship with RÃikkÃnen that he has had with Schumacher. Insiders, 
however, insist that Todtâs job is safe and that he has too many friends 
inside Fiat for Montezemolo to contemplate sacking him. And they add that 
Montezemolo, who is not regarded as malicious, genuinely doesnât want that 
and knows Todt is the best man to run Ferrari. One says: âWhatever Luca is, 
he isnât stupid.â 

But another outside observer says that Todt has been wounded by what has 
transpired and doesnât believe the story is concluded, as he says: âTodt is 
the most malicious person on two legs and he will hold that against Luca.â

Next month to mark the end of Michael Schumacherâs final year in Formula One, 
BusinessF1 writers look back at Schumacherâs extraordinary career off-track. 
From the secret backer who financed his early career to the astonishing battle 
between his first two managers, Willi Weber and Burkhard Nuppenny, for control 
of his career. The amazing tussle between Jordan and Benetton for his services. 
His contract machinations with Flavio Briatore and his wooing by Jean Todt. We 
look closely at how he earned nearly US$600 million in 15-and-a-half years of 
competing in the sport.

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